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Robert H. Jackson: The Middle Ground
JAmES A. NIELSON*
The precept that political philosophy is interrelated with
political activity is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than by
political writings during Franklin. Roosevelt's administrations;
and considerable of the writing of the period may be regarded
as having shaped policies and practices of the New Deal., It is
the major concern of this paper to examine the political phil-
osophy of one of the men closely connected with the New Deal
and one who has influenced the period both as a political and
legal writer and as a practitioner of government: Robert H.
Jackson.
Aspects of the New Deal philosophy can be traced in a fairly
clear line back through the New Freedom of the first Wilson
administration to the period of "trust busting" of Theodore
Roosevelt's Square Deal, and further, to the agrarian democratic
philosophies of Jefferson and Jackson." The fact that the party
of Jefferson and Jackson has been transmuted from a party of
limited national powers to one of strong national powers has
tended to obscure this historical connection." In part, this change
can be expressed in terms of the "ins" versus the "outs"; but more
fundamentally, it is intelligible in terms of the use to which
national power is to be placed. The Federalists held to a mercan-
tilist economic theory and were interested in asserting the su-
premacy of the national government to prevent interference with
commerce by the states and, conversely, to encourage the devel-
opment of the mercantilist system of protective trade barriers,
sound currency, and in general, by the support of those govern-
mental measures designed for the protection of. the creditor
classes.8 When the national government became a positive instru-
ment in the hands of a public majority, interested in the regu-
lation of industry and the business, the development of the rights
* Staff Sergeant, Army Air Forces. This paper was originally prepared
for a graduate research course in the Department of Political Science, Uni-
ersity of California.
1. See, for example, Swisher, American Constitutional Development (1943).
2. Brant, Storm Over the Constitution (1936) c. II, Transmigration of
Souls.
3. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913).
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of labor and the mitigation of the privileges of wealth, then
such power was opposed by those who had once supported it.
We see in this problem a fundamental disagreement over the
proper sphere and purpose of governmental activity although the
discussion of this disagreement is more often carried on in terms
of economic self-interest than in terms of the role of government
in society.
Although the New Deal in practice has reflected conflicting
and oftentimes contradictory policies, there is a core of consistent
philosophy set forth by its leaders subject to rational exposition.'
Central to the New Deal philosophy is the denial of the effective-
ness of natural automatic regulation of economic life through the
economic laws of the market place. Competition in a fundamen-
tal sense is dead. It can no longer be relied upon to maintain
order in the economic life of the nation. Thus the powers of the
national government must be asserted to regain and maintain
balance between economic groups and between production and
consumption through the use of what the late President Roose-
velt once termed "public power."5 This philosophy maintains,
for example, that it is the duty of government to provide employ-
ment where private enterprise has failed; that production must
be channeled into those lines regarded as desirable by the na-
tional government, and the rights of labor to a living wage and
an equal bargaining arrangement with their employers must be
guaranteed by the national government. As against the modern
corporation, the individual has lost personal liberty and his posi-
tion in society has been rendered insecure. It is the purpose of
government to correct these basic inequalities and to provide a
certain minimum security to the individual. The tracing in detail
of the exposition of this philosophy and its development in gov-
ernment practices is not the purpose of this paper. However, a
summation of this philosophy is given in a passage from Pro-
fessor Edward S. Corwin:
"Under the democratic system there are two possible concep-
tions of what a government ought to be doing, providing
neither is pressed to a logical extreme. One is that govern-
ment ought to preserve an open field for talent and not dis-
4. Unless otherwise 'indicated, the majority of this discussion of general
New Deal philosophy is from Thomas P. Jenkins, Reactions of Major Groups
to Positive Government in the United States (1930-1940) (Unpublished Mss.,
University of Michigan, 1943).
5. 5 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public'Papers and Addresses (1936) 16, Annual
Message to Congress, January 3, 1936.
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turb the rewards which free competition brings to individuals.
The watchword of such government will, of course, be Liberty.
The other theory is that government ought to intervene for the
purpose of correcting at least the most pronounced inequali-
ties which are apt to result from the struggle for advantage
among private groups and individuals. The watchword of such
a government will be Equality. '6
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson came to the New
Deal in 1934 as General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue. Prior to his entrance into the national administration he had
been engaged in the practice of civil and corporation law in
Jamestown, New York, and had had experience in public life as
corporation counsel for the City of Jamestown. His political
rise within the Roosevelt administration was extremely rapid.
In 1936 he was appointed Assistant Attorney General in Charge
of the Tax Division of the Justice Department. In 1937 he was
made Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Anti-trust
Division, and in 1938, he was appointed to the position of Solicitor
General. In January 1940, he was made Attorney General of the
United States, succeeding Frank Murphy, who had been ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court. Jackson served as Attorney Gen-
eral until June, 1941, when he was appointed an Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, filling the vacancy created
by the registration of Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes.7
Jackson's career with the Roosevelt administration was such
that he was closely associated with the more important New Deal
legislative efforts of the pre-war period. These included advocacy
of important changes in the tax laws, the period of trust busting
under his and Thurman Arnold's direction, testing in the courts
of the revised Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Utility Holding
Company Act and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. At one
time or another, Jackson was prominently mentioned as a pos-
sible Democratic candidate for the Governor of New York, and
as a possible heir to the presidency.
There are probably few public personages connected at one
time or another with the Roosevelt Administrations who have
6. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (1941) 3, quoted by Jenkins, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 41.
7. Material for this section is from Benson, Associate Justice Robert H.
Jackson (1941) 27 A.B.A.J. 478.
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set forth more clearly both in writing and in public speeches the
nature of what may be called the New Deal political philosophy.
For this reason, if for no other, a study of Robert Jackson's politi-
cal and legal philosophy is of importance. It is of importance also
because Jackson occupies today a position which gives him a
major share of the balance of power on the Supreme Court.8 He
can, in many instances, determine Supreme Court decisions and
may well be decisive in the next several years in determining
the principaltrend of American constitutional law as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
There is, of course, some danger in attempting to define a
man's political philosophy. Aside from one book which Jackson
has written, his principal ideas have been expressed in public
speeches and articles on subjects of current and temporary im-
portance and in his writings as a member of the Court. For the
latter, the dicta is often of more importance than the decision.
It is also recognized that the work of government officials and
judges is not entirely of their own creation. For this there is no
criteria for selecting the original from the final version. The best
that can be done is to accept it all and trust it represents the
author's principal point of view, if not entirely his personal
efforts.
III
"The Supreme Court of the United States has come to be
regarded as the unique feature of the American governmental
system. It is a feature which distinguishes the American Govern-
ment from practically all modern political systems."9 It can be
said with almost equal validity that the power and prestige that
the courts and the legal profession enjoy generally in the United
States is virtually unrivaled in almost any other part of the
world. The Supreme Court especially in this century has enjoyed
virtually an unchallenged position in the interpretation of higher
constitutional law which frequently becomes the final interpre-
tation of public policy. We have had what Justice Jackson has
called "Government by Lawsuits."'10
Jackson, however, is distinguished from many of his legal
brethren by his critical examination of the public utility of su-
8. Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44 (1945) 39 Am. Pol.,
Set. Rev. 42.
9. Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and
Politics, 1789-1835 (1944) 3.
10. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941) c. IX.
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premacy of the courts and the omniscience of judges and lawyers.
At the same time, he has been keenly aware of the almost un-
rivaled power enjoyed by the courts, and especially the Supreme
Court:
"These constitutional lawsuits are the stuff of power politics
in America. Such proceedings may for a generation or more
deprive an elected Congress of power, or may restore a lost
power, or confirm a questioned one. Such proceedings may
enlarge or restrict the authority of an elected president. They
settle what power belongs to the Court itself and what it con-
cedes to its 'coordinate' departments. Decrees in litigation
write the final work as to distribution of powers as between
the Federal Government and the state governments and mark
out and apply the limitations and denials of powers constitu-
tionally applicable to each. To recognize or to deny the power
of governmental agencies in a changing world is to sit as a
continuous allocator of power in our governmental system.
The court may be, and usually is, above party politics and
personal politics, but politics of power is a most important
and delicate function, and adjudication of litigation is its
technique.""
It may be that the judicial decision of private disputes which
frequently produces an enunciation of public policy as a by-
product is "inherently ill-suited, and never can be suited to de-
vising or enacting rules of general social policy. Litigation pro-
cedures are clumsy and narrow, at best; technical and tricky, at
their worst.' 1 2
It would appear that the principal disadvantage of finally
testing public policy and governmental action by the courts alone
is that the only views that reach the court are those of the law-
yer, or at best, views presented through the lawyers, "in spite of
the fact that the effect of the decision may be far greater in other
fields than in jurisprudence."'21 In fact, we may doubt the ability
of the legal profession "to furnish single-handed the rounded and
comprehensive wisdom to govern all society." 1 4 The legal pro-
fession like many others has become over-professionalized, and we
tend to "forget that law is the rule for simple and untaught
11. Id. at 287-288.
12. Id. at 288.
13. Id. at 291. This problem may be doubly important when the interests
of the legal profession itself are involved, as for example, questions, of law
and fact in proceedings for disbarment of attorneys.
14. Id. at 291-292.
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people to live by. We complicate and over-refine it as a weapon
in legal combat until we take it off the ground where people live
and into the thin atmosphere of sheer fiction."'15
Legal fictions tend to mischief whenever they are believed
to have a validity of their own as apart from any purpose they
serve. "To regard a giant corporation, with its stockholders, di-
rectors and employees, as a .single person is a useful and con-
venient fiction to enable the corporation to sue and be sued as
simply as any individual; but to maintain that a worker dealing
with his corporation is dealing simply with another individual
like himself is to pervert a fiction as only a legal mind could do
with solemnity."'16
It is, of course, recognized that fictions give a measure of
flexibility to the judicial process and often serve "as bridge with
the past in order to reach new ground,"" but "too often they are
employed as a screen to cover up a retreat."'8 The law looks to
the past and preparation for the bar is all too often a study of
old precedents. 9
The above were Jackson's views based largely on his ex-
perience as the administrator in the Justice Department. What
are these views as a member of the Court?
Jackson dissenting in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association"° had this statement to make:
"A judgment as to when the evil of a decisional error exceeds
the evil of an innovation must be based on very practical and,
in part, upon policy considerations. When, as in this problem,
such practical and political judgments can be made by the
political branches of the government, it is the part of wisdom
and self-restraint and good government for courts to leave the
initiative to Congress."
Taking issue with Justice Black, who held for a majority
Court that the insurance business was a part of interstate com-
merce and subject to the federal anti-trust acts, Jackson agreed
that insurance was commerce, that the court had previously erred
in placing insurance beyond the regulatory powers of the Con-
gress, but upon that mistake an intricate system of state control
15. Id. at 292.
16. Id. at 294.
17. Id. at 293.
18. Id. at 294.
19. Id. at 295.
20. 322 U.S. 533, 594, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1195, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 1480 (1944).
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had been established which might be endangered by superim-
posing federal laws; that the intent of Congress was not clear;
and consequently, once the mistake of power had been corrected
by the Court, the expediency of utilizing such power should be
left to Congress. To quote Walton Hamilton, "... error once
vested must not be disturbed."21
Apparently this view of precedent is not wholly new in
Jackson's philosophy, for in United States v. Swift & Company,22
he had stated in a concurring opinion:
"If the Court is to dispatch its business as an institution, some
accommodation of views is necessary and, where no principle
of importance is at stake, there are times when an insistence
upon a division is not in the interests of the best administra-
tion of justice."
And, on another occasion:
"This Court may follow precedents, irrespective of their mer-
its, as a matter of obedience to the rule of stare decisis. Con-
sistency and stability may be so served. They are ends de-
sirable in themselves, for only thereby can law be predictable
to those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower
courts which must apply it. But we can break with estab-
lished law, overrule precedents, and start a new cluster of
leading cases to define what we mean, only as a matter of
deliberate policy. '23
If I understand this point of view correctly, precedent has
assumed considerable importance of its own, quite apart from
any guidance it may serve to the formulation of social policy.
Precedents and the rule of stare decisis give stability to the law,
and make the law predictable to lower courts, the lawyers and
the laity, who must shape their conduct by what the courts have
already said is law. This is desirable even granting the court has
erred, as with the interpretation that insurance is not commerce.
We can, of course, break with the rule of stare decisis and begin
a new "cluster of leading cases . . . as a matter of deliberate
policy. ''24
It is at this point that Jackson's views emerge most clearly
21. Hamilton, The Supreme Court Today, II: Nine Minds, One Law
(1944) 159 Nation 207.
22. 318 U.S. 442, 446, 63 S.Ct. 684, 686, 87 L.Ed. 889, 891 (1942).
23. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 323, 63 S.Ct. 207,
225, 87 L.Ed. 279, 299 (1942).
24. Ibid.
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as to how he believes good government is to be obtained and
whom he believes should govern. The courts and judges are to
exercise a self-denying ordinance and not take the lead in the
formulation of social policy-that is the business of Congress.
Thus in his dissent in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association25 there is a recognition that Congress has the
power, by appropriate legislation, to bring the business of insur-
ance within the purview of the anti-trust acts. In fact, Congress
is the appropriate body to do so, not the Court.
While it seems to me that Jackson has weighted the rule of
stare decisis rather heavily in his legal philosophy, it must be
admitted that he sees it as useful to deny to the courts the power
to determine social policy while leaving Congress or the legis-
lative body free to determine within wide limits the major lines
of governmental policy without fear that the weight of outmoded
precedent will unduly hamper that power. The courts are limited
in their power to govern, as we have seen previously, by the
narrow professionalism of the lawyers and the inherent limita-
tions of adjudication, i.e., attempting to extend principles arrived
at in private disputes to become rules of general social policy.
Thus, it is not the business of the courts "to remedy inequalities
necessarily incident to the administration of the statute"26 "or
to waste time in settling 'the verity of the philosophical assump-
tion on which they rest.' "27 This is the business of Congress, not
the courts. In final analysis "The measure of success of a demo-
cratic system is found in the degree to which its elections really
reflect rising discontent before it becomes unmanageable, by
which government responds to it with timely redress, and by
which losing groups are self-disciplined to accept election re-
sults. ' 2 "But election as a devic6 to defend against violence by
registering and responding to this 'scattered discontent and dif-
fuse enthusiasm' fails, if the popularly elected regime is to be
prevented judicially from putting its policies into force .... It
leaves the grievances of the frustrated majority to grow, and
more extreme remedies to commend themselves to those who
25. 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944).
26. Gregg Cartage and Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 84, 62
S.Ct. 932, 937, 86 L.Ed. 1283, 1291 (1941).
27. Ibid. See also Jackson's dissent in City of Indianapolis v. Chase
National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 84, 62 S.Ct. 15, 24, 86 L.Ed. 47, 58 (1941): "If .
the forefathers are thought to have been unwise in creating a federal juris-
diction based on diversity of citizenship, we would think the remedy of those
so minded would be found in Congressional withdrawal of such jurisdiction
rather than in the confusing process of judicial constriction."
28. Jackson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 316.
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would have been satisfied with more moderate (policies), if more
timely, ones."29
IV
It is today recognized by many serious students of American
constitutional law that Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison-° asserting the power of the Supreme Court to
nullify acts of Congress rested on debatable constitutional
grounds.8' However, this power is. today almost universally
recognized as is the power of the courts to overrule specific acts
of administrative bodies by an examination of what are known
as jurisdictional facts or points of law.2 2 A discussion of the foun-
dation of this power is, therefore, largely academic. Germane,
however, to this discussion is a consideration of how this power
shall be exercised by courts in specific situations, especially so
in the review of the acts of regulatory bodies, which today far
overshadows in volume and frequently in importance the con-
sideration of the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
There is first of all in Jackson's philosophy a primary recog-
nition that the courts are to review only points of law and not
facts, although there is considerable confusion in certain of his
court decisions as to what constitutes a review of points of law
as distinguished from facts. 2 The application of general prin-
ciples to specific cases is nowhere an easy process. However, in
stating the general principle Jackson is clear enough:
"Review of facts is not the conventional function of this Court
and resort to it at this stage of this litigation is somewhat less
than fair to the courts below as well as to the litigants."3 4
29. Id. at 319.
30. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
31. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (2 ed. 1932) 623
et seq., where Professor Haines analyzes Justice Marshall's reasoning in
Marbury v. Madison.
32. Jackson, op. cit. supra note 10, at c. I, II.
33. The literature on jurisdictional facts in law journals and elsewhere
is very voluminous, and only a few examples are cited here. Brown, Facts
and Law in Judicial Review (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1899; Haines, The Adop-
tion of Administrative Law and Procedure to Constitutional Theories and
Principles (1940) 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1; Hart, Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Decisions (1941) 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 499; Hoyt, Judicial Review of
Administrative Orders (1939) 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 237. The discussion by
Haines is much more exhaustive on the relation of administrative bodies to
courts than a consideration of jurisdictional facts, but is excellent for con-
sideration of the entire problem of judicial review of the acts of administra-
tive agencies.
34. Dissent in City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63,
83, 62 S.Ct. 15, 23, 86 L.Ed. 47, 57 (1941).
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Or again:
"We should not substitute our own wisdom or unwisdom for
that of administrative officers who have kept within their ad-
ministrative powers."3 5
With this general principle few students of constitutional law
would take issue. The critical problem is what constitutes a point
of law as distinguished from facts in an administrative ruling, in
any particular instance.
In United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation,"8
Jackson criticized the majority of the Court speaking through
Justice Douglas for ruling the Interstate Commerce Commission
did not have authority under the "grandfather clause" of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 to prohibit a motor common carrier
from handling certain classes of articles simply because the car-
rier had not handled these classed of articles before. It is diffi-
cult to comprehend that the grandfather clause is anything mpore
than a conceptual principle supplied the regulatory body by
Congress to decide specific cases in dispute. In other words,
Jackson seems to be criticizing the Court for passing on juris-
dictional facts in the case.
On another occasion Jackson, speaking for the majority, re-
manded a case for rehearing to the National Labor Relations
Board to consiaer whether violence in the course of the original
hearing reflects on the credulity of witnesses. 7 If this is not an
examination of the facts of the case, it nearly approaches it by
reflecting on the method by which facts are obtained without
at the same time calling into question the entire procedural tech-
nique of the administrative body. It is also Jackson's belief that
the Court is in error in holding that the result reached and not
the method employed is controlling and that "the fact that the
method employed to reach the result may contain infirmities is
not then important." 8
The proponents of the doctrine to emancipate regulatory
bodies from judicial control have won a long step in their battle
35. Dissent in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S.
475, 495, 62 S.Ct. 722, 732, 86 L.Ed. 971, 986 (1941). See also Jackson's majority
opinions in Southport Petroleum Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 315
U.S. 100, 62 S.Ct 452, 86 L.Ed. 718 (1941); I.C.C. v. Inland Waterways Corp.,
319 U.S. 677, 63 S.Ct. 1296, 87 LEd. 1655 (1943) and dissent in Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 S.Ct. 339, 87 L.Ed. 424 (1943).
36. 315 U.S. 475, 62 S.Ct. 722, 86 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
37. National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,
318 U.S. 9, 63 S.Ct. 594, 87 L.Ed. 579 (1942).
38. Federal Power Commission v. Hope National Gas Co. & City of Cleve-
land v. Hope National Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1943).
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with the recognition from the courts that only points of law will
be examined, as distinguished from the facts. As one writer has
put it, "As against the research facilities available to any com-
.mission, the fact-finding of the courts is primitive. And remote
control, however wise, is no substitute for judgment on the
spot."39 The efforts of the judiciary and the legal profession gen-
erally to mold the regulatory agencies into creatures of their own
image persists unabated. Thus, for example, the Office of Price
Administration employs an arsenal of legal talent to exercise a
sort of pseudo-judicial review over the acts of the administrators
on the theory that virtually every act of government is the special
preserve of the attorneys.*
Jackson recoils, as do most of his brethren on the bench,
from reading into such phrases as "due process," "freedom of
contract" and "constitutional immunities" a nearly absolute pro-
hibition on the powers of the legislature to deal with the com-
plex problems of modern economic society through the enact-
ment of regulatory legislation and the creation of the modern
regulatory agency.41
As with the review by the courts of acts of Congress, Jackson
is likewise concerned that the courts do not frustrate the will of
a popular majority by unduly hampering the acts of regulatory
agencies acting under legislative grants of power. If there exists
inequalities in administration, procedural error and other admin-
istrative defects, Congress is the preferred agency for correcting
such defects, not the courts.
V
The New Deal, as I have indicated in the introductory por-
tion of this paper, gained political power largely as a result of
popular expression of dissatisfaction with the failure of Repub-
lican administrations to assert the power of the national govern-
ment to remedy the crisis in the economic order. The symptoms
of failure were the depression and the crash of 1929. Between
those who believe the economic order will operate and produce
a reasonably high level of prosperity largely through the opera-
tiori of automatic natural economic laws and those who believe it
is necessary for the government and particularly the national
39. Hamilton, The Smoldering Constitutional Crisis (1943) 108 New
Republic 73, 74.
40. Barnett, American Constitutional Development, A Challenge to Admin-
istration (1944) 4 Public Administration Rev. 159.
41. Jackson, Back to the Constitution (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 475.
19451
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government to exercise regulation in economic affairs, there is a
fundamental cleavage in philosophy. The battle grounds, on the
governmental level, have been the courts, the Congress and the
regulatory agencies themselves. The stakes of power have been
high-the responsibility for the direction and control of the
American economic system.
This struggle for power is revealed in the entire argument
over judicial review and the question of the jurisdiction of regu-
latory agencies, vis-a-vis the courts.
Speaking generally, Jackson can be said to be on the side
of the "governmental regulators"-although his specific philoso-
phy will be made more clear in the following discussion.
There is first of all the recognition by Jackson that there is
no immediate alternative to private capitalism and the so-called
profit system.
In an address before the American Political Science Associa-
tion in 1937, he gave a clear indication of this:
"Whatever system the remote future brings forth, there is no
present system alternative to so-called private capitalism moti-
vated by hope of private profit. It has always been my belief
that this generation would do better to get the best out of its
existing system rather than to urge theoretical systems that
have no present foundations in our traditions, our loyalties
or our institutions.
"The only agency with the power to condition capitalism
and industrialism to survive is the government. To this end I
have supported, in general, the program of reform called the
'New Deal' with more doubts about its adequacy than about
its moderation. 4 2
In another connection he has said:
"We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed upon
us either by the government or by big business. We want no
system of detailed regulation of prices by the government nor
price fixing by private interests. We do not want bureaucracy
or regimentation of any kind, but we will prefer governmental
to private bureaucracy and regimentation, if we have to
make such a choice. We can not permit private corporations
to be private governments. We must keep our economic sys-
42. Jackson, The Philosophy of Big Business (1938) 4 Vital Speeches 208.
[Vol. VI
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tem under the control of the people who live by and underit.,,43I
As to specific forms of govenrmental regulation, we are left
no precise blue-print. Apparently, however, there is no room for
considerable experimentation in the techniques of control. It is
clear that taxation is a legitimate method of economic control
by the government and also for equalizing maldistribution of
wealth.4 4 Also, the anti-trust laws should be strengthened and
rigorously enforced as a desirable alternative to a top-heavy
bureaucracy charged with economic regulation. 45 He has, on
occasion, defended what is today termed "deficit spending" as a
desirable method of increasing the total wealth of the country
and alleviating the plight which Franklin Roosevelt estimated
enveloped one-third of the nation. 46
Probably the greatest single legal barrier to effective federal
control of the economy has been the traditionally narrow inter-
pretation given the commerce clause of the Constitution by the
courts. In this regard Jackson is for a liberal interpretation of
commerce which will leave the federal government and Congress
free to apply controls where it deems them desirable,47 and it
is his further belief that it is not the function of the courts to
adjudicate on the fairness or workability of the plan of regu-
lation.4 8
As among the three traditional branches of government, the
executive enjoys greater power than do the courts or Congress.
This supremacy of the executive is, of course, enormously en-
hanced by a state of crisis such as war, although it is always
43. Jackson, Should the Anti-trust Laws Be Revised? (1937) 71 U.S.L.
Rev. 575, 582.
44. See especially Jackson, The People's Business, The Truth About Taxes
(1936) 95 Forum 22; The Proposed Revision of Corporation Taxes (1936) 2
Vital Speeches 431; Big Corporations Rule (1935) 84 New Republic 99; The
Rich Get Richer (1935) 84 New Republic 68.
45. Jackson, Financial Monopoly: The Road to Socialism (1938) 100 Forum
303; and Should the Anti-trust Laws Be Revised? (1937) 71 U.S.L. Rev. 575.
46. Jackson, America Has Only Scratched Her Resources (1936) 96
Forum 108.
47. Jackson, The Supreme Court and Interstate Barriers (1940) 207
Annals 70.
48. See especially Wickard v. Felburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129, 63 S.Ct. 82, 91, 87
L.Ed. 122, 137 (1942): "It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restrain-
ing hand on the self-interest of the regulated and that advantages from the
regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of economic interest
between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under
our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and respon-
sible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial
determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness of the plan of
regulation we have nothing to do."
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necessary that this power be exercised constitutionally.4  The
crux of the problem of executive control, through the direction
of administrative agencies, is not so much that this power will
be exercised capriciously or unconstitutionally (the courts are
an effective check here) but that the control will be exercised
ineffectually and fail to accomplish its desired ends.
VI
Corollary to the broader question of economic regulation by
the national government is the issue of states rights and the
problem of local rights and power generally. For the issue of
state and local rights is today asserted by precisely the same
groups who are most prone to criticize efforts to assert national
control over the economic order.
Jackson, as We have seen, is among those who believe the
national government the only effective governing body for con-
trol of the national economy. This, however, does not preclude
the exercise of state and local police powers to control specific
aspects of the economy, particularly where the states have tra-
ditionally exercised control and have demonstrated ability to deal
with a problem effectively.50
It is also not intended that the war powers shall be used to
ride roughshod over rights of states and local governments.
49. For a development of Jackson's point of view in this regard, see his
decision as attorney general on "Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in
Exchange for Over Age Destroyers." 39 Opinions of Attorney General 484.
50. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64
S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944). Speaking for a unanimous court in Terminal
Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1,
63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1942), Jackson held an order of a state railroad
commission to provide cabooses for rear brakemen a valid exercise of police
power and not a burden on interstate commerce. He has also held that it
was a valid exercise of police power for a state to grant a utility authority
to build a power transmission line on highway constructed on Indian terri-
tory. United States v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 318 U.S. 206, 63 S.Ct.
534, 87 L.Ed. 716 (1942). See also Jackson's dissent in Williams v. State of
North'Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942). In this case
Jackson argued for allowing one state the power to refuse to recognize the
validity of a divorce granted by another state to citizens of the first state.
For his view on the powers of a state to tax citizens of another state, see
dissents in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U.S.
335, 64 S.Ct. 1028, 88 L.Ed. 1309 (1943) and International Harvester Co. v.
Wisconsin Department of Taxation and Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Same, 322 U.S. 435, 64 S.Ct. 1060, 88 L.Ed. 1373 (1943). For his views as to
when a state imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce see Jackson's
concurring opinion in Northwest Airlines v. State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed. 1283 (1943). These cases are not discussed in the main
body of the pajer as they form questions of legal technicalities and not of
general political philosophy. They serve, however, to illuminate Jackson's
specific points of view.
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"At a time when great measures of concentration of direction
are concededly necessary, it may be thought more farsighted
to avoid paralyzing or extinguishing local institutions which
do not seriously conflict with the central government's place.
Congress has given no indication it would draw all such state
authority into the vortex of the war power. Nor should we
rush the trend to centralization where Congress has not."'
In this connection it can be inferred that Jackson is advocat-
ing pragmatic standards, pragmatic in the sense of what works
best should be followed in delineating local and national powers.
To what end these pragmatic standards are to be used will be
made clear in a subsequent portion of this paper.
vii
The tradition of Eighteenth Century liberalism which is
prevalent today holds that the only threat to personal liberty or
civil rights comes from government; hence, extensions of govern-
mental power are to be opposed for this reason if for no other
because "that government is best which governs least." Exten-
sions of governmental power, therefore, are to be opposed per se
without reference to the ends to be achieved.
5 2
The one fact this line of reasoning fails to include, however,
is that there has developed in the United States and elsewhere,
a duality of power-on the one hand governmental or political
power and on the other, private or business power-which in its
uncontrolled application may result in the extinguishment of
civil rights quite as effectively as undue expansion of political
power. Many regard state control of many aspects of the econ-
omy as necessary to prevent, and as the only alternative to,
interference with what are regarded as rights of individuals by
business groups."
It appears to me that this point of view constitutes much of
the motivating philosophy behind many of the New Deal reforms.
For example, the National Labor Relations Act was on the one
hand a restriction on the personal rights of employers to operate
their economic holdings in respect to the collective organization
of their workers; on the other hand, it asserted a right for the
51. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed.
635 (1943).
52. See, for example, Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (1934) for a con-
temporary exposition of this argument.
53. Merriam, Public and Private Governments (1944) and Brady, Business
as a System of Power (1943).
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workers-the right, free from private restrictions, to organize
and bargain collectively with their employers.
Liberty is not strictly political in content but social and eco-
nomic as well.5 4 The point often missed in making easy generali-
ties about strong government and personal liberty is that strong
governments can be used to assert and protect rights of individ-
uals and otherwise unprotected groups in our society against the
encroachments of private powers quite as readily as they can
be turned to the extinguishment of these rights. To what ends
these powers will be placed depends on the temper of our society
and the observance of civil rights guarantees by the governed
and the governors.
Civil liberties in wartime have always assumed an especially
important place in governmental policy. The experience of the
European democracies, overrun and conquered by the Axis pow-
ers, had revealed the dangers of allowing hostile "fifth column-
ists" within the borders of a democratic state free and unre-
stricted operations under traditional guarantees of civil liberties
to attack the foundations of the guarantees on which they relied
and to actually assist in the military operations of the Axis pow-
ers. At the same time, there is always danger that while restrain-
ing those groups whom Justice Holmes' phrase constitute a
"clear and present danger" to the established government there
will be restraints and. denials of civil liberties against those
groups and individuals who in any fashion are critical of the
war effort.
With this brief background discussion, we turn now to Justice
Jackson's views on the problem of personal rights and civil
liberties.
In an address as Attorney General, before the American Judi-
cature Society on May 7, 1941, Jackson discussed this problem.5
In this address, Jackson urged that the government be given
adequate powers prior to the actual outbreak of war to deal
with deportable aliens, sedition, and the "fifth column" generally.
Contrasting our rigid system of laws and civil right guarantees
with the flexible system of England under the "Defense of the
54. Dodd, The Struggle for Democracy in the United States (1918) 28
International Journal of Ethics 465: "Democracy is equality, economic, polit-
ical and even social in large measure .. . [it is] social organization in which
all normal men and women have their proportionate voice in the determina-
tion of public policy in which all have free opportunity to earn a livelihood,
share according to capacity in the common prosperity, and bear their just
proportions of the burdens of war and other disasters."
55. Jackson, Mobilizing the Profession for Defense (1941) 7 A.B.A.J. 350.
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Realm Act" he stated that the greatest danger lay in not liberaliz-
ing these laws and that failure to do so encouraged the growth of
vigilantism. On another occasion he stated:
"The law enforcement of the United States and that of the
several states and that of the municipalities should be kept
under the control of officials who are responsible for their
conduct and subject to the discipline and training of legally
recognized law enforcement bodies. Expand them if we must
to whatever extent necessary, but under no circumstances let
us tolerate the taking of law enforcement into private hands."5 6
Although recognizing that the government needs strong powers
to deal with sedition and actual threats against the state, Jackson
was quick to speak out against what he believes to be unconstitu-
tional and unfair methods to deal with this problem. Writing as
Attorney General to Senator Russell of Georgia on the Bridges'
deportation bill, he stated:
"As an American I would not, for the sake of my own liberty,
deny the protection of uniform and indiscriminatory laws and
fair hearings to even the humblest and meanest of men. As
an official of the United States I cannot in good conscience
do other than recommend strongly against the bill."5"
As to the specific content of Jackson's civil rights philosophy,
several of his Court opinions are of interest. Speaking for the
majority in Pollock v. Williams,,5 he held a Florida act, making
the non-performance of a contract of labor service a fraud,
unconstitutional because it violated the "involuntary servitude"
clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl,5 9 he stated:
... one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state
law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
express a grievance in a labor matter by publication unat-
tended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful
or oppressive."
On another occasion he asserted the power of the national
56. Jackson, America v. Fifth Columnists, Our Government Is Prepared
Against the Fifth Column (1940) 29 Survey Graphic 545. See also Jackson,
The Federal Prosecutor (1940) 31 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. and Criminology 3.
57. Quoted in The Attempt to "Exile" Harry Bridges (1940) 14 Soc. Serv.
Rev. 569, 572.
58. 322 U.S. 4, 64 S.Ct. 792, 88 L.Ed. 1095 (1943).
59. 315 U.S. 769, 774, 62 S.Ct. 816, 818, 86 L.Ed. 1178, 1183 (1941).
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government acting through the National Labor Relations Board
to prevent the extinguishment of labor's right to bargain col-
lectively by a private group through the execution of individual
employment contracts. 0
On the other hand, Jackson has been cautious about exercis-
ing the power of federal judicial review to nullify a state's con-
viction for crime because the Court may have doubts as to the
methods employed to obtain a conviction.
"The burden of protecting society from most crimes against
persons and property falls upon the state. Different states
have different crime problems and some freedom to vary
procedure according to their own ideas. Here, a state was
forced by an unwitnessed and baffling murder to vindicate its
law and protect its society. To nullify its conviction in this
particular case upon a consideration of all the facts would be
a delicate exercise of federal judicial power. But to go beyond
this as the Court does today, and divine in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an exclusion of confes-
sions on an irrebutable presumption that custody and exam-
ination are 'inherently coercive' if of some unspecified dura-
tion within thirty-six hours, requires us to make more than
passing expression of our doubts and disagreements."'6
It must not be presumed, however, that federal judicial
review will never be used to invalidate state laws dealing with
criminal problems. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,62 he concurred
in a separate opinion with the majority which held a state law
requiring sterilization of habitual criminals a violation of the
"dequal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The most famous recent constitutional cases relating to the
problems of civil rights has to do with a group of cases involving
the religious sect known as Jehovah Witnesses. Jackson's views
in these cases are of considerable interest and importance.
60. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct.
576, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1943).
61. Dissent in Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 174, 64 S.Ct. 921, 928,
88 L.Ed. 1192, 1209 (1943). "The use of the due process clause to disable the
states in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate
a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or
economic experimentation." In this respect Jackson is consistent with his
views on the role of the courts in interfering with the legislative branch
of government when economic regulation is involved.
62. 316 U.S. 535, 546, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1663 (1941): "There
are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality
and natural powers of a minority-even those who have been guilty of what
the majority define as crimes."
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Invalidating several convictions of Jehovah Witnesses for
violations of local hand-bill ordinances, Justice Douglas for a
majority court had stated:
".... we can restore to their high, constitutional position the
liberties of itinerant evangelists who disseminate their relig-
ious beliefs and the tenets of their faith through distribution
of literature.""
Taking issue with this point of view, Justice Jackson dissent-
ing in Douglas v. City of Jeannette64 stated:
"The real question is where their rights end and the rights of
others begin. The real task of determining the extent of their
rights on balance with the rights of others is not met by
pronouncement of general propositions with which there is
no disagreement."65
"In my view, the First Amendment assures the broadest
tolerable exercise of free speech, free press, and free assembly,
not merely for religious purposes, but for political, economic,
scientific, news, or informational ends as well. When limits are
reached which such communication must observe, can one go
farther under the cloak of religious evangelism? Does what is
obscene, or commercial, or abusive, or inciting become less so
if employed to promote a religious ideology? I had not sup-
posed that the rights of secular and non-religious communica-
tions were more narrow or in any way inferior to those of
avowed religious groups."6 6
"The First Amendment grew out of an experience which
taught that society can not trust the conscience of a majority
to keep its religious zeal within the limits that a free society
can tolerate. I do not think it any more intended to leave the
conscience of a minority to fix its limits. Civil government
can not let any group ride rough-shod over others simply
because their 'consciences' tell them to do so."'
63. Murdock v. Pennsylvania and seven other cases, 319 U.S. 105, 117,
63 S.Ct. 870, 877, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1301 (1942). See also Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1942); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1942).
64. 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1942).
65. 319 U.S. 157, 178, 63 S.Ct. 877, 883, 87 L.Ed. 1324, 1337.
66. 319 U.S. 157, 179, 63 S.Ct. 877, 888, 87 L.Ed. 1324, 1337.
67. Ibid. See also dissent in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177,
64 S.Ct. 438, 445, 88 L.Ed. 645, 658 (1943): "My own view may be shortly put:
I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities
begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public. Religious
activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-
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While the state can thus limit the secular activities of religious
groups it cannot at the same time compel positive allegiance to
the state on the part of these same groups.
. Speaking for the majority in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,"' Jackson, in overruling Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,0 held that we cannot compel a minority to
declare a belief through the observance of a rite-namely the
flag salute in public schools.
"We can have intellectual individualism and rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price
of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they
are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which per-
mit an exception, they do not now occur to us."70
as nearly absolutely free as anything can be. But beyond these, many
religious denominations or sects engage in collateral activities intended to
obtain means from unbelievers to sustain the worshippers and their leaders.
They raise money, not merely by passing the plate to those who voluntarily
attend services or by contributions by their own people, but by solicitations
and drives addressed to the public by holding public dinners and entertain-
ments, by various kinds of sales and Bingo games and lotteries. All such
money-raising activities on a public scale, are, I think, Caesar's affairs and
may be regulated by the state so long as it does not discriminate against one
because he is doing them for a religious purpose, and the regulation is not
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the other provisions of the Constitu-
tion." This view is somewhat contradicted in Jackson's dissent in United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1943), where he
favored dismissal of mail fraud charges against the "I Am" group on the
ground it involved examination of religious faith.
68. 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1942).
69. 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1942).
70. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187,
87 L.Ed. 1628, 1639 (1942). Jackson has also come out strongly for the civil
rights of another minority group-the Japanese-American. Dissenting in
Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243, 65 S.Ct. 193, 206, 89
L.Ed. 202, 217 (1944), he stated: "Now, if any fundamental assumption under-
lies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable. Even if all of
one's antecedents had been convicted of treason, the Constitution forbids its
penalties to be visited upon him, for it provides that 'no Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attained.' Article 3, section 3, cl. 2. But here is an attempt to make
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VIII
No one who has given even the most cursory examination
to the history of public law generally and the history of judicial
review specifically in the United States can fail to be struck with
its political nature, yet it is precisely this aspect of the subject
which has been most assiduously ignored in discussions of the
subject. It is, of course, in the chambers of the Supreme Court
where this political process has received its highest expression.
"The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is nothing less
than the arbitration between fundamental and ever-present
rival forces or trends in our organized society. The technical
tactics of constitutional lawsuits are part of a greater strategy
of statecraft in our system. Every really important movement
has been preceded by 'leading cases' and has left others in its
wake, even as will the New Deal. Conflicts which have divided
the justices always mirror a conflict which pervades society.
In fact, it may be said that the Supreme Court conference
chamber is the forum where each fundamental cause has
had its most determined and understanding championship.
The student of our times will nowhere find the deeper con-
flicts of American political philosophy and economic policy
more authentically and intelligently portrayed than in the
opinions and dissents of members of the Supreme Court."'
It is too early to entirely estimate Jackson's importance to
the Court or the effect of his general philosophy upon his line of
decisions. It seems clear, however, he does not command the
position of leadership enjoyed by Justices Black or Frankfurter,
or even of Douglas. It would also be the part of rashness to
identify his position with any particular division of the Court,
although it would appear that he is less bold than, say, Black,
in pioneering new lines of public policy, and somewhat less con-
ceptual than Frankfurter, in asserting the philosophy of Holmes
or Brandeis, to be the ultimate frontier in American liberalism.
As pointed out previously, Jackson occupies more or less what
may be termed the "middle of the road" and is frequently able
an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is the son of
parents as to whom he had no choice and belongs to a race from which there
is no way to resign. If Congress in peace-time legislation should enact such
a criminal law, I should suppose this Court should refuse to enforce it."
71. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941) 312. See also
Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Poli-
tics, 1789-1835 (1944) c. 1.
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to determine by his vote the ultimate character of the majority
opinions of the Court. Thus, his influence may be of greater
importance than may be imagined from simply reading the opin-
ions of the Court.7 2
Jackson's thought is perhaps less conceptual than any mem-
ber of the Supreme Court, and with Justice Holmes, he is appar-
ently convinced that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience. '7 3 He is, however, impressed with the weight
of precedence and is desirous the Court perform its symbolic
function of maintaining the fiction of continuity in its decisions.
It is perhaps important the courts do this, but between prece-
dence and the need for change, the former should not stand in
the way of the latter.
There are, of course, some incongruities and paradoxes in
Jackson's thought and particularly in his opinions from the bench.
This is not to be wondered at for few men have presented con-
sistent philosophies unless they have reduced their thoughts to a
single systematic work where the inconsistencies have become
apparent and are, therefore, resolved. Too often consistency is a
sign of mental stagnation. Constructive politics is a tough-minded
process and contemporary political problems are tremendously
complex and varied in their implications. It is my own thought
that we -are perhaps more secure with those judges who have
no set solution to every problem but are willing to examine
anew the facts of a case and the tenets of their philosophical
beliefs. By this test Justice Jackson is not found wanting-no
matter how we may disagree with his specific decisions.
Despite these minor points of paradox and apparent incon-
sistency, there is a consistent thread explicit in his writings as
to how he believes good government is to be achieved and
whom he believes capable of governing. Further, there is implied
in the means he advocates to achieve good government his values
as what government is for. Both problems are central to his
72. Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 9, at 45-46: "At each end of the court
there is a pair of justices (Black-Douglas and Frankfurter-Roberts) who
were in dissent fifteen times together. Further, it appears that the Black-
Douglas nucleus is usually joined by Murphy and, somewhat less often, by
Rutledge, these four justices forming a definite bloc on the left of the Court.
In the same way, Frankfurter and Roberts are jointed in their dissents suffi-
ciently often by Reed and Stone to compose a right-wing bloc. On the bal-
ance, Jackson seems also to belong to this group, although there is the
curious fact that he dissented only once with Chief Justice Stone as com-
pared with five occasions on which he joined Justice Douglas in dissent.
His position would seem to indicate a position less consistent or more com-
plex than that of his colleagues."
73. Holmes, The Common Law (18W1) 1.
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entire political philosophy and I now turn to their consideration.
If there is one consistent line of reasoning in Jackson's
thought both on and off the bench, it is his constant reiteration
that the courts have only limited ability to -govern. They are
professionalized bodies run by highly specialized men-lawyers-
and are out of touch with many of the human realities which
which government is concerned. Further, the very nature of
adjudication has inherent limitations-its inadequacy in attempt-
ing to generalize governing principles for a whole society by
considering facts in a particular suit.
Although upholding the symbolic value of consistency in
legal decisions, the rule of stare decisis is not generally empha-
sized for its own ends, but rather as a check on the courts in
embarking on new lines of policy where Congress has not done
so. Congress is the legislative body, not the courts.
Jackson's line of reasoning shows a deep-seated conviction
in the democratic process and a willingness to allow the powers
of government to be exercised by our most representative gov-
erning body-the Congress.
Stare decisis is to be followed where it will prevent the
courts from legislating-it is not used, as it was from 1933 to
1937, to frustrate the desires of a popularly constituted majority.
In case after case, Jackson continually asks the question: Has
Congress intended this shall be the intent of this law? And we
find him in exhaustive examinations of legislative history and
politics attempting to discover the answer to his question. In
fact, his method is closely akin to the famous Brandeis brief in
which history, social and economic considerations, a study of
political debate and an examination of non-legal opinion assumes
an importance nearly equal to legal precedence. 74
In fact Jackson's tendency toward non-legal research may
account in part for his apparent uncertainty in decision. Knowl-
edge cannot be said to lead to-dogmatism in the social sciences.
The same viewpoint is also evidenced in his consideration of
acts of administrative agencies-which are the creatures of the
legislative bodies. It is not the business of the courts, but of
74. See, for example, in addition to the cases already cited, Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 S.Ct. 336, 87 L.Ed. 843 (1942) and District of Colum-
bia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62- S.Ct. 204, 86 L.Ed. 329 (1941); United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 709 (1944) and
Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770, 89
L.Ed. 788 (1944). See also his recent article-Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyers Clause of the Constitution (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, for examples of
Jackson's exhaustive research methods.
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Congress to "remedy inequalities necessarily incident to the
administration of the statute."7
This then is the means of achieving good government but for
what ends? Here, I believe, we have to assume the ends from
the means, as Jackson is not explicit. In emphasizing that the
legislature, not the court, is the law making body, I think we
can logically infer that he is interested in self-government and
political equality where achievements are tested in the prag-
matic school of results achieved. For if the courts are criticized,
it is for representing an elite group who operate in a symbol
world far removed from Henry Wallace's "common man." The
legislature, on the other hand, receives its powers and support,
and represents, no matter how imperfectly, the will of the major-
ity and its results are tested by experience, not in abstract logic.
If insurance is to be subject to anti-trust suits, let the people
through Congress say that it is-for Congress is the representa-
tive body, not the courts.
By the same token, Jackson has been hostile to concentra-
tions of wealth in our society and to its unregulated use. For
private wealth, especially in its modern corporate form, is hostile
to the principle of political equality and the democratic process. 6
Interpreted in terms of traditional American political thought,
Jackson's philosophy would seem to stem from what may be
called the Jeffersonian tradition. This tradition is hostile to
private wealth, emphasizes political equality, and has cham-
pioned congressional power against both the executive and the
courts.7 7 In short, it has stood for democratic government as
against government by any elite group whether based on prop-
erty, education or heredity.
Ix
Big business and big industry begat big government and
have enormously complicated the problems with which govern-
ment must deal. The problems with which government must
concern itself have, in fact, become so enormously complex that
Congress and the courts are able to do no more than pass on
the broad outlines of social policy-leaving the details of solu-
tions of problems to administrative bodies staffed by experts.
75. Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 84, 62 S.Ct.
932, 937, 86 L.Ed. 1283, 1291 (1941).
76. See articles cited in note 44, supra.
77. Beard, The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (1915).
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This, however, has raised a counter-problem-namely, the prob-
lem of democratic control of administrative agencies. For if the
courts represent an elite group, so does the modern administra-
tive agency-with its experts, its rituals and its symbolism. If
the masses of mankind are baffled by the technicalities of the
courts, they are equally confused by O.P.A. directives and pro-
cedures.
Partially the problem of democratic control of the admin-
istrative branch of the government can be met by developing
and improving legislative controls. Without discussing techniques
it can be said Congress will probably develop more responsibility
when the courts refrain from reviewing and revising in detail
acts of administrative agencies.
The second solution lies in improved selection of personnel,
especially at the policy level, for administrative agencies. Many
top administrative posts in the government today are filled from
two groups-business men and attorneys, and both groups are
largely hostile to principles of governmental control over the
economy."8 There simply does not exist a sufficiently large body
of trained career civil servants from which to staff administrative
agencies. If, therefore, a considerable portion of the administra-
tive machinery of the government has been slanted toward cham-
pioning the interests of corporate wealth in the United States-
they have won their decision by default, not design.79
78. Hamilton, supra note 39.
79. Barnett, supra note 40.
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